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In addition, the fact that defendant was a smaller corporation than
plaintiff and would have liked to avoid the expense of conducting
its own tests was not considered a sufficient showing of hardship.
Where the expert's report is designed for purposes of litigation,
some protection from disclosure is necessary. An examination
into an adversary's case file should be permitted only on special
circumstances. The qualified privilege granted by CPLR 3101(d)
and applied by the court here is fair to both parties. 80 It would
appear that before the court can order disclosure of the report,
it must find, first, that the material is no longer duplicable, and
second, that injustice or hardship will result if the report is
withheld. 18' Once both of these conditions
are met the material
8 2

would be obtainable under the statute.

Designation of examining physician.
CPLR 3121 provides: "After commencement of an action in
which the mental or physical condition or the blood relationship
of a party . . . is in controversy, any party may serve notice on

another party to submit to a physical, mental or blood examination
by a designated physician .

. .

."

This section governs medical

examinations in actions in which they are relevant. In regard
to medical examinations in personal injury actions, some of the
departments have, additionally, their own rules which will govern

to the extent that they are not inconsistent with CPLR 3121. ' 83
8
In Adamian v. Strandwall,1
4 a personal injury action, plaintiff
moved to vacate defendant's notice designating the physician to
examine plaintiff on the ground that the physician named was
objectionable. The court held that under the second department
rule'8 5 once the party to be examined objects to the physician
selected by the examining party, the court must direct an examination by a physician named by it, and it is not necessary that the
objecting party set forth reasons for the objection.
Under CPA § 306 the court had a statutory duty to name a
disinterested physician where the parties could not agree. 86
CPLR 3121 contains no express language applicable when a
physician designated by a party is objected to. In most cases
the party to be examined does not object to the examining party's
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physician, but the question remains what procedure governs in
such a case.
As stated above, the decision in the instant case was not
governed by CPLR 3121 but by the rule of the second department
governing medical examinations in personal injury actions. The
decision requires the court to appoint an impartial physician whenever the party to be examined objects to the physician named
by the examining party, even though the objection to the physician designated is completely arbitrary. The court based its
decision on its inability to determine the professional qualifications
of a physician on motion papers. However, requin*rng the court
to select an impartial physician merely because a party arbitrarily
objects to a physician named by his adversary places an unnecessary burden on the court. 87 It would seem that the party
to be examined should at least state reasons for the objection,
in which case the examining party could name another physician.
The decision in the instant case is in accord vith first department
practice. In that department, however, the problem is 8simplified
because of the maintenance of an impartial medical panel.
Compelling authorizations to obtain hospital records.
CPLR 3121, in addition to allowing physical and mental examinations, also provides for the execution of authorizations permitting a party to obtain hospital records. 9 The authorizations
required to be executed encompass only those hospital records
relating to the injuries sustained in the accident-not any and
all hospital records. 9 0 Does 3121 permit one to obtain hospital
records of a decedent in a wrongful death action?
Keays v. Vanderheden Hall, Inc.8 1 involved a combined
wrongful death and personal injuries action. Defendant moved
pursuant to CPLR 3121 for an order compelling plaintiff-administrator to furnish written authorizations permitting defendant to
obtain hospital records of the decedent. Plaintiff opposed the
application on the ground that CPLR 3121 authorizes the pro187 The decision rendered by this court has in effect been overturned by a
later decision of the appellate division, second department. The appellate
division held that plaintiff's objections to the physician designated by defendant
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